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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
 
 The United States and other federal appellants respectfully request oral 
argument.  Oral argument in this case of national importance will illuminate the 
position of the parties and aid the Court in reaching a decision.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a challenge brought by Texas and other States to enjoin—
nationwide—enforcement policies that the Secretary of Homeland Security adopted 
to manage the government’s limited immigration enforcement resources and prioritize 
the removal of aliens who threaten national security or public safety, have committed 
crimes, or recently crossed the border unlawfully.  The challenged policies advance 
that critical national effort by, among other things, establishing guidelines for 
deferring action on the removal of other aliens who are not priorities, pose no such 
threats, and have longstanding and close family ties in the United States.  The policies 
are a quintessential exercise of prosecutorial discretion, an executive function that is 
not subject to judicial review.  And they are an exercise of authority that Congress 
expressly granted to the Secretary to establish policies for enforcement of the 
immigration laws, a uniquely federal domain into which States may not intrude.  See 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).   
The plaintiff States disagree with the Secretary’s exercise of enforcement 
discretion and have invoked the judicial power to countermand it.  But their claims 
are, at bottom, policy disagreements that must be resolved through the political 
process; they are not an Article III case or controversy.   Indeed, to reach the merits 
of plaintiffs’ claims, the district court was forced to stretch the limits of Article III 
standing well beyond the breaking point. 
That this case involves a policy disagreement and not a true case or controversy 
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is most obvious in the district court’s holding that standing may be based on the 
federal government’s supposed “abdication” of its duty to enforce the immigration 
laws.  Putting aside that it is factually wrong (the federal government has removed 
more than 2.4 million aliens and substantially increased border security over the past 
six years, and the new policies will make enforcement more effective), the district 
court’s unprecedented “abdication standing” theory violates Article III’s bedrock 
requirement of a concrete and cognizable injury.  It allows States to sue based on 
nothing more than their disagreement with how federal officials prioritize their limited 
resources in light of real-world constraints—the very choices that the Constitution 
and federal statutes entrust to the Executive.   
The district court’s only other ground for finding standing—the prospect that 
Texas may incur additional costs to issue driver’s licenses to aliens accorded deferred 
action who obtain work authorization—is also fundamentally infirm.  Allowing States 
to manufacture Article III standing on the basis of such incidental and attenuated 
consequences would allow States to assert a seemingly limitless power to embroil the 
federal courts in reviewing virtually any exercise of discretion by the federal 
government.  Moreover, any costs Texas might incur do not constitute a cognizable 
injury because they would result from the State’s own choice to subsidize the cost of 
licenses rather than requiring applicants to bear the cost themselves, and because such 
costs would also likely be more than offset by these same policies’ expected economic 
gains to the States.    
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In addition to failing the constitutional test for standing, plaintiffs’ claim is 
precluded by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself.  The Supreme Court has 
held that, by enacting 8 U.S.C. 1252(g), Congress specifically insulated the exercise of 
enforcement discretion through deferred action from judicial review.  That provision 
is directed most immediately at suits by aliens who are denied deferred action and 
would be most directly affected by the Secretary’s enforcement discretion.  But it 
confirms the broader principle that other individuals and States, who have no direct 
stake in the Secretary’s exercise of enforcement discretion, have no right to challenge 
grants of deferred action. 
The district court’s merits determination is equally flawed.    The court based its 
preliminary injunction solely on plaintiffs’ claim that the guidelines here needed to go 
through notice and comment under the APA.  But a memorandum that announces 
guidelines for the exercise of enforcement discretion, and that does not establish 
rights or impose obligations on the public, is a paradigmatic example of a general 
statement of policy, which the APA categorically exempts from notice and comment. 
To avoid that result, the district court artificially bifurcated the Secretary’s 
policy judgments, acknowledging that the APA does not impose any requirements on 
the Secretary’s discretionary choice of enforcement priorities but claiming that the 
guidance also conferred “legal presence” and “work authorization” that did trigger 
notice and comment.  That was error.  Deferred action does not give an alien any legal 
right to remain in this country; DHS may revoke deferred action and initiate removal 
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proceedings at any time. And while work authorization may follow from the 
Secretary’s choice of deferred action, an alien’s ability to obtain work authorization 
flows from a decades-old, unchallenged regulation that was itself the product of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.  Thus, the district court’s invocation of the APA’s 
notice-and-comment requirements is without basis.   
The preliminary injunction irreparably harms the defendants and the public 
interest by disrupting the Secretary’s comprehensive effort to most effectively marshal 
the agency’s limited resources to protect national security, public safety, and border 
security, while deferring low-priority removals of aliens that would impose undue 
humanitarian costs. In contrast, plaintiffs will suffer no cognizable harm if the 
injunction is lifted.   
The court compounded these errors by entering a sweeping nationwide 
preliminary injunction that restrains the Secretary in plaintiff States not found to have 
standing and in States not parties to this litigation—a consequence that disrespects the 
independent sovereign authority of those States, many of which have made the 
judgment that the Secretary’s policies will make their States safer and more 
economically prosperous.  Even if plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief, the 
nationwide breadth of the injunction is indefensible. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 1.  This is a civil action against the federal government that purports to state 
claims under the APA and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.  Plaintiffs 
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asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 1346.  ROA.55.  For reasons 
discussed below, plaintiffs lack Article III standing, and the district court therefore 
lacked jurisdiction. 
 2.   The district court entered a preliminary injunction on February 16, 2015. 
The federal government filed a timely notice of appeal on February 23, 2015.  The 
Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Immigration Enforcement And Prosecutorial Discretion. 
 
This case implicates the unique authority of the federal government to 
administer and enforce the nation’s immigration laws.  Whenever Congress vests 
enforcement authority in an Executive Branch agency, the agency presumptively 
possesses discretion over the exercise of that authority, “balancing a number of 
factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.”  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 
(1985).  That is especially so in immigration, where “flexibility and the adaptation of 
the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the 
program.”  United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).  
Consistent with this basic feature of the immigration laws, Congress has authorized 
the Secretary to “establish[] national immigration enforcement policies and priorities,” 
6 U.S.C. 202(5), and to “establish such regulations; . . . issue such instructions; and 
perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority.”  8 U.S.C. 
1103(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
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Discretion over the removal of aliens is a central aspect of this enforcement 
discretion.  “A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion 
exercised by immigration officials.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 
(2012).  “Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to 
pursue removal at all,” id,  and “[a]t each stage [of the removal process,] the Executive 
has discretion to abandon the endeavor.”  Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. 
(“AAADC”), 525 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999).  This exercise of discretion may consider 
numerous factors, including “whether the alien has children born in the United States, 
long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service,” and may 
also involve policy choices that bear on the nation’s foreign relations.  Arizona, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2499.  
Enforcement discretion is essential to the mission of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and to the Secretary’s authority.  Congressional funding 
decisions have provided DHS with only enough annual resources to remove a few 
hundred thousand of the estimated 11.3 million undocumented aliens in the United 
States, as well as recent border crossers and other removable aliens.  ROA.97.  
Recognizing that DHS must decide where to focus its limited resources, Congress has 
directed DHS to ensure “that the government’s huge investments in immigration 
enforcement are producing the maximum return in actually making our country 
safer,” H.R. Rep. No. 111-157, 8 (2009), and to prioritize “the identification and 
removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of the crime,” Department of 
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Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 114-4, 129 Stat 39, 43 (2015).  
Moreover, while Congress has provided that at least $1.6 billion be used to identify 
and remove criminal aliens, see id., Congress has not otherwise constrained DHS’s 
discretion, instead simply providing a lump sum for “necessary” enforcement and 
removal efforts.  Id.; see Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191-194 (1993) (allocation of 
lump-sum appropriation committed to agency discretion). 
One well-established form of discretion over removal is “deferred action.”  As 
a regulation promulgated more than 30 years ago explains, deferred action is an “act 
of administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower 
priority” by deferring removal of an alien for a temporary period.  8 C.F.R. 
274a.12(c)(14).   The Supreme Court specifically recognized in AAADC that the 
Executive has long “been engaging in a regular practice (which had come to be known 
as ‘deferred action’) of exercising [its] discretion” not to pursue the removal of aliens 
for various reasons, including humanitarian grounds and enforcement prioritization.  
525 U.S. at 483-84.  Deferred action does not give an alien a legal right to remain in 
the United States; DHS may revoke or terminate deferred action and begin removal 
proceedings at any time at its discretion.  See ROA.87. 
The Executive Branch has, over several decades, accorded deferred action to 
selected members of various groups, including victims of domestic abuse, victims of 
human trafficking and other crimes, students affected by Hurricane Katrina, and 
certain widows and widowers of U.S. citizens.  See Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 
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185, 193-94 & nn.2-5 (D.D.C. 2014).  Similar forms of discretionary relief from 
removal have been employed, on an individual and group basis, for an even longer 
period.  Id. at 194 & n.7. 
Congress has enacted statutes that recognize and rely on the Executive 
Branch’s discretion to defer action regarding the removal of an alien.  Congress 
enacted 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) in 1996 to protect discretionary determinations concerning 
deferred action from judicial intrusion.  AAADC, 525 U.S. at 483-85.  In 2000, 
Congress authorized “deferred action and work authorization” for certain 
undocumented aliens seeking visas under the Violence Against Women Act.  8 U.S.C. 
1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV).  In 2005, Congress provided that States may, but are not 
required to, issue drivers licenses that will be acceptable identification for certain 
federal purposes to aliens accorded deferred action. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
§ 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), 119 Stat. 231, 302, 49 U.S.C. 30301 note.  And Congress has also 
provided that certain aliens not otherwise authorized to remain in the United States 
may be accorded deferred action.  See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, § 423(b), 115 Stat. 272, 361. 
Congress has made it unlawful to employ an “unauthorized alien,” see 8 U.S.C. 
1324a(a)(1), but has provided that an alien “authorized to be so employed by the 
Attorney General” (now the Secretary) is not subject to this prohibition, id. 
§ 1324a(h)(3). Regulations adopted in 1981, pursuant to public notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, provide that aliens who are accorded deferred action may be authorized 
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to work if employment is an economic necessity.  8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).  Many 
other categories of aliens—including aliens without formal immigration status—can 
similarly obtain work authorization.  See id. §§ 274a.12(a), (c).  Without work 
authorization, these aliens would be left to search for employers who would hire them 
illegally or to rely on support from family members, friends, or charity. 
II. Deferred Action For Childhood Arrivals And For Parents Of U.S. 
Citizens And Lawful Permanent Residents. 
   
A.  On June 15, 2012, the Secretary issued a memorandum on the exercise of 
enforcement discretion with regard to “young people who were brought to this 
country as children and know only this country as a home.”  ROA.123.  The Secretary 
determined that “additional measures are necessary to ensure that our enforcement 
resources are not expended on these low priority cases but are instead appropriately 
focused on people who meet our enforcement priorities.”  ROA.123.   
The 2012 memorandum, the validity of which is not challenged in this case, 
established a discretionary enforcement policy referred to as Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals, or “DACA.”  It provided that immigration officials may, 
temporarily and on a case-by-case basis, refrain from pursuing the removal of aliens 
who: (1) were under the age of sixteen when they came to the United States; (2) were 
present in the United States on the effective date of the memorandum and 
continuously resided here for at least the five preceding years; (3) meet certain 
educational or military-service criteria; (4) have not been convicted of significant 
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criminal offenses and do not otherwise threaten public safety or national security; and 
(5) are under age 31.  ROA.123. 
The Secretary’s 2012 memorandum was intended “to set forth policy for the 
exercise of discretion within the framework of existing law” and conferred no 
substantive rights.  ROA.125.  DHS thus remains free to institute or re-institute 
removal proceedings against aliens who have been accorded deferred action under 
DACA at any time and at its discretion.   
 B.  On November 20, 2014, the Secretary issued a memorandum revising 
DHS’s priorities for apprehending, detaining, and removing aliens who threaten 
national security, public safety, and border security.  ROA.558-563.  Noting that DHS 
lacks sufficient resources to investigate and prosecute every immigration violation, the 
memorandum sets forth three levels of priority for removal.  First priority is given to 
removal of aliens suspected of engaging in terrorism, espionage, or gang activity; 
aliens convicted of serious crimes; and aliens apprehended at the border.  ROA.560.  
Second priority is given to removal of aliens who have been convicted of certain 
misdemeanors, aliens who unlawfully entered the United States after January 1, 2014, 
and aliens who have significantly abused their visas or the visa waiver program.  
ROA.560-561.  Finally, third priority is given to removal of aliens who are not 
described in Priority 1 or 2, but have been issued a final order of removal on or after 
January 1, 2014.  ROA.561.  Other unlawfully present aliens remain subject to 
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removal, but the memorandum calls for focusing resources on aliens in the priority 
categories.  ROA.562. Plaintiffs do not challenge this prioritization memorandum. 
C.  On the same date, the Secretary issued a related memorandum, referred to 
as the 2014 Deferred Action Guidance, to enhance this removal prioritization effort.  
ROA.83-87.  The Deferred Action Guidance is the subject of this litigation. 
The Guidance announced the Secretary’s intention to broaden the class of 
aliens who may request deferred action under DACA in two respects: first, by 
removing 2012 DACA’s upper limit on age at the time of application, and second, by 
changing the date by which an individual must have been in the United States from 
June 15, 2007, to January 1, 2010.  ROA.85-86.  DHS was scheduled to begin 
accepting requests based on the new DACA threshold eligibility criteria on February 
18, 2015.  ROA.86.  The Guidance also increased the length of deferred action under 
DACA from two to three years, effective November 24, 2014.  ROA.85-86.  
 In addition, the Guidance announced that DHS would consider according 
deferred action to certain aliens who are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent 
residents, a policy known as “DAPA.”  To be considered for deferred action under 
DAPA, an individual must: (1) have, as of November 20, 2014, a son or daughter who 
is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident; (2) have continuously resided in the 
United States since before January 1, 2010; (3) have been physically present in the 
United States on November 20, 2014, and at the time of making a request for 
deferred action; (4) have had no lawful immigration status on November 20, 2014; (5) 
      Case: 15-40238      Document: 00512986669     Page: 21     Date Filed: 03/30/2015
12 
 
not fall within one of the enforcement priorities established by the Secretary; and (6) 
“present no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, make[] the grant of 
deferred action inappropriate.”  ROA.86.   
 As with DACA, a decision to defer action on removal of an alien based on the 
DAPA policy is to be made on a case-by-case basis.  The alien must pass a 
background check and be individually assessed in light of the Secretary’s enforcement 
guidelines ROA.86-87.  If appropriate, deferred action would be accorded for three 
years, subject to renewal, and could be terminated at any time.  ROA.87.  As with 
other aliens who have been accorded deferred action, aliens accorded deferred action 
under DAPA may be authorized to work provided that they establish economic 
necessity, see 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14), and pay a processing fee.  ROA.87.   
 Like the 2012 DACA policy, the Guidance does not establish any substantive 
entitlement to deferred action.  ROA.87.  Aliens who meet the threshold eligibility 
criteria may be denied deferred action if other case-specific factors, such as arrests 
without conviction or involvement in gang activity, indicate that deferred action is 
inappropriate.  ROA.86-87.  And deferred action confers no substantive rights.  Id.  
DHS can revoke deferred action under DAPA, like DACA, at any time at its 
discretion. 
III. District Court Proceedings. 
In December 2014, the plaintiff States brought this suit to challenge the 
Secretary’s authority to issue the Deferred Action Guidance.  Plaintiffs claimed that 
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the Guidance: (1) violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, art. II, § 3, cl. 5; 
(2) fails to comply with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement, 5 U.S.C. 553; 
and (3) is arbitrary and capricious under the APA’s substantive provisions, id. § 706.  
ROA.76-78. 
On February 16, 2015, two days before DHS was scheduled to begin accepting 
requests based on the broadened DACA threshold eligibility criteria, the district court 
issued a nationwide preliminary injunction.  The injunction prohibits defendants from 
implementing “any and all aspects or phases” of DAPA and “any and all aspects or 
phases of the expansions (including any and all changes)” to DACA, as outlined in the 
2014 Deferred Action Guidance.  ROA.4373-4374.  The court did not enjoin the 
2012 DACA policy, nor did it enjoin DHS from establishing removal priorities.  Id. 
The district court held that “at least one Plaintiff, Texas,” would suffer an 
injury as a result of the Guidance, for two reasons.  ROA.4442.  First, the court 
concluded that the Guidance would require Texas to incur costs associated with 
issuing driver’s licenses to aliens accorded deferred action.  ROA.4397-4398.  Second, 
the court concluded that standing could be predicated on a novel “abdication” theory, 
which the court described as “a situation when the federal government asserts sole 
authority over a certain area of American life and excludes any authority or regulation 
by a state; yet subsequently refuses to act in that area.”  ROA.4432.   
On the merits, the court declined to rule on the claims that the Guidance 
violates the Take Care Clause and the APA’s substantive provisions.  ROA.4496-
      Case: 15-40238      Document: 00512986669     Page: 23     Date Filed: 03/30/2015
14 
 
4497.  Instead, the court relied exclusively on the claim that the Guidance should have 
undergone notice-and-comment rulemaking.  ROA.4487. The court rejected the 
Secretary’s position that the Guidance is a general statement of policy, which the APA 
expressly exempts from notice and comment.  See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). 
The district court concluded that Texas would suffer irreparable harm absent a 
preliminary injunction because the Guidance would be “virtually irreversible” once 
implemented, and because Texas would incur unrecoverable costs by issuing driver’s 
licenses.  ROA.4490.  The court also stated that a nationwide injunction would not 
harm defendants.  ROA.4494.  The preliminary injunction applies nationwide, 
prohibiting implementation of the Guidance not only in Texas, but also in plaintiff 
States that have not been found to have standing, and in States that are not parties to 
the suit, including ones that filed an amicus brief identifying harms that the 
preliminary injunction imposes on them.   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1.  In issuing a nationwide injunction on behalf of plaintiff States to 
countermand the federal government’s immigration enforcement discretion, the 
district court violated fundamental Article III principles. 
Third parties lack standing to contest Executive enforcement decisions that are 
directed at others, and the Supreme Court has specifically ruled that third parties have 
no cognizable interest in the federal government’s enforcement of the immigration 
laws.  This principle carries even greater weight where, as here, plaintiffs are States 
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and no cognizable injury is shown.  Immigration is a uniquely federal concern, and 
Congress has entrusted the enforcement of the immigration laws exclusively to the 
federal government.  The district court allowed plaintiffs to enter a domain where our 
Constitution’s structure denies them the power to act, and, in so doing, embroiled the 
judiciary in refereeing a policy disagreement between some (but by no means all) 
States and the federal government over how immigration enforcement should be 
carried out.   
Rather than respect the federal government’s exclusive authority over the 
enforcement of the immigration laws, the district court relied on the very exclusivity 
of that authority as a basis for finding standing to challenge the Executive’s exercise 
of it.  This unprecedented concept of “abdication standing” is wrong in every respect, 
and vividly confirms that this case is a policy disagreement, not a legal dispute.  
Factually, the claim of “abdication” is implausible; over the past six years, DHS has 
removed 2.4 million aliens and focused substantial additional resources on border 
security, and the Guidance will make enforcement more effective, not less.  Legally, 
“abdication standing” lacks any basis.  It confuses the nature of plaintiffs’ legal 
claims—that DHS acted unlawfully—with an irreducible requirement of Article III—
that a plaintiff show a cognizable injury.  The Guidance reflects DHS’s effort to focus 
its limited resources on pursuing aliens who threaten national security, public safety, 
and border security, and to avoid expending resources on aliens who do not.  A 
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State’s disagreement with those choices cannot be a cognizable injury sufficient to 
confer Article III standing. 
The only other basis on which the district court found standing—that Texas 
would incur unreimbursed costs by issuing driver’s licenses for aliens accorded 
deferred action under the 2014 Guidance—also does not establish a cognizable 
Article III injury.  Any attenuated costs Texas bears in issuing driver’s licenses are 
voluntarily assumed and not attributable to the federal government.  The Guidance 
does not require States to issue driver’s licenses to aliens who are accorded deferred 
action, much less require States to subsidize the costs.  The court also disregarded the 
prospect of positive fiscal consequences for the State from the Guidance, including 
increases in state tax revenues.  Most fundamentally, if the incidental and attenuated 
costs of state services provided to aliens with work authorization were a sufficient 
basis to enjoin the federal government’s immigration policies, a State could attempt to 
use similar incidental effects to justify a vast interference with countless exercises of 
federal immigration enforcement discretion, upsetting both the uniquely federal 
interest in immigration matters and separation-of-powers principles. 
2. On the merits, the district court erred in holding that the Guidance needed 
to go through notice and comment.  Plaintiffs cannot proceed under the APA because 
judicial review is impliedly precluded by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
and because they fall outside the zone of interests protected by the INA.  And even if 
plaintiffs could bring suit under the APA, the APA’s notice-and-comment 
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requirements expressly exempt general statements of policy.  A general statement of 
policy “advise[s] the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes 
to exercise a discretionary power.”  Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) 
(quotation marks omitted).  That is precisely what the 2014 Guidance does.  It does 
not have the force and effect of law, it does not bind DHS itself, and, contrary to the 
district court’s view, it does not deprive the agency’s officers of discretion in deciding 
whether to defer the removal of any particular alien.   
While purporting to recognize that it lacked authority to review the Secretary’s 
enforcement discretion policies set forth in the Guidance (and in particular that the 
APA’s notice-and-comment requirements did not apply to an agency policy statement 
setting forth those policies), the district court nevertheless ordered DHS to comply 
with notice-and-comment procedures based on the theory that the Guidance went 
beyond enforcement discretion and provided concrete benefits:  the status of “legal 
presence” and the opportunity for work authorization.  That ruling reflects an 
artificial and misguided interpretation of the Guidance.   DHS retains unrestricted 
discretion to seek removal at any time of an alien who has been accorded deferred 
action.  Nor does the Guidance confer the benefit of work authorization.  It is not the 
Guidance but a decades-old regulation that makes work authorization available to all 
categories of aliens accorded deferred action.  That regulation was itself promulgated 
pursuant to notice and comment, thereby satisfying any such requirement the APA 
might impose.   
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3. Because plaintiffs did not show that the Guidance would cause them any 
cognizable injury, they failed a fortiori to show that they are facing irreparable harm.  In 
contrast, the preliminary injunction causes serious injuries to the federal government, 
impairing DHS’s comprehensive efforts to concentrate its resources on high-priority 
removals and border security, and disrupting DHS’s extensive preparations to 
implement the Guidance.  The injunction also harms many U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents and their families; it harms state and local law enforcement 
agencies whose interests are furthered by increased cooperation from aliens accorded 
deferred action; and it harms the financial interests of States and localities in increased 
employment and tax revenues. 
4. Even if plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, the 
sweeping nationwide injunction exceeded the proper scope of its equitable authority.  
Injunctive relief should be tailored to the parties before the court and should not 
burden the interests of non-parties—especially non-parties that an injunction would 
harm.  The district court therefore should have confined any preliminary injunction to 
Texas, the only State that it found to have standing, or failing that, to the plaintiff 
States.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should only issue if 
the movant establishes: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a 
substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the 
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threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the 
injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the 
public interest.”  Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation 
omitted).  This Court reviews a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Id.  
“Despite this deferential standard,” however, “a decision grounded in erroneous legal 
principles is reviewed de novo.” Id.  Thus, while the district court’s findings of fact are 
subject to clear-error review, “conclusions of law are subject to broad review and will 
be reversed if incorrect.” Id. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 2014 
DEFERRED ACTION GUIDANCE. 
 
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating 
an injury that is (1) concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) fairly traceable 
to the challenged action; and (3) redressable.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 
1138, 1147 (2013).  Where, as here, standing is premised on a claim of an alleged 
future injury, Article III demands not merely a possibility of injury, but a showing that 
the injury is “certainly impending.”  Id. at 1148.  And the standing inquiry is 
“especially rigorous” where, as here, a plaintiff asks a court “to decide whether an 
action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was 
unconstitutional.”  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997).  Plaintiffs fail to satisfy 
these constitutional requirements. 
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A. The States’ Attempt to Countermand the Federal Government’s 
Exercise of Immigration Enforcement Discretion Is Not 
Justiciable. 
 
The decision to prosecute—or to defer prosecution—is a core exercise of 
Executive power.  Separation-of-powers concerns are therefore at their apex when a 
court is asked to countermand the Executive’s enforcement decisions.  United States v. 
Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc).  In particular, the Supreme Court 
has held that an agency’s decision “not to exercise its enforcement authority” is 
presumptively shielded from judicial review.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 
(1985).  An agency’s enforcement strategy “often involves a complicated balancing of 
a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise,” and the “agency is far 
better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper 
ordering of its priorities.”  Id. at 831-32.  Further, an agency’s decision not to exercise 
enforcement authority “generally does not [involve the] exercise [of] coercive power 
over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas 
that courts often are called upon to protect.”  Id. at 832.  An agency’s exercise of 
enforcement discretion “shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a 
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been 
regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch.”  Id.   
For these reasons, courts are especially loath to adjudicate controversies 
between the government and third parties who are not the objects of the enforcement 
decisions.  The Supreme Court has held squarely that a plaintiff “lacks standing to 
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contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted 
nor threatened with prosecution.”  Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).  
Similarly, “a plaintiff who complains merely that a benefit has been unconstitutionally 
granted to others is asserting only a ‘generalized grievance’ that does not allow the 
plaintiff standing.”  Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002) (Jones, J., 
concurring). 
These principles apply with particular force in the realm of immigration.  The 
Supreme Court has held that private persons “have no judicially cognizable interest in 
procuring enforcement of the immigration laws.”  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 
883, 897 (1984).   Indeed, the Court has “long recognized the power to expel or 
exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s 
political departments largely immune from judicial control.”  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787, 792 (1977) (quotation marks omitted)).  The Court has made clear that “[t]he 
obvious need for delicate policy judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid 
intrusion into” the field of immigration. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).  
Decisions involving immigration “may implicate our relations with foreign powers.” 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).  They also must account for “changing 
political and economic circumstances.”  Id.  Because of the need for “flexibility in 
[immigration] policy choices,” such choices are typically “more appropriate to either 
the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.” Id.; see also New Jersey v. United 
States, 91 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1996) (immigration enforcement decisions “patently 
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involve policy judgments about resource allocation and enforcement methods [that] 
fall squarely within a substantive area clearly committed by the Constitution to the 
political branches”). 
That States are the plaintiffs here heightens, rather than diminishes, these non-
justiciability principles.  The “responsibility for regulating the relationship between the 
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political branches of the 
Federal Government” rather than the States. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81-82 (emphasis 
added).  In its recent decision in Arizona, the Supreme Court was emphatic in its 
recognition that “the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal 
Government.”  132 S. Ct. at 2506.   Under our constitutional structure, States may not 
interfere with the federal government’s ordering of immigration enforcement 
priorities.  See id. at 2498 (emphasizing the breadth of “federal power to determine 
immigration policy”).  Thus, more than 15 years ago, this Court dismissed as 
nonjusticiable Texas’s comparable claim that the federal government had “failed to 
enforce the immigration laws and refuse[d] to pay the costs resulting therefrom.” 
Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997).  This suit accordingly should 
have been dismissed at the threshold. 
B. The District Court’s Theory of “Abdication Standing” Is Baseless. 
 
Instead of dismissing the suit, the district court held that plaintiffs, or at least 
Texas, could proceed on a newly-invented theory of “abdication standing.” 
ROA.4432-4443.  The court described “abdication standing” as “a situation when the 
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federal government asserts sole authority over a certain area of American life and 
excludes any authority or regulation by a state; yet subsequently refuses to act in that 
area.”  ROA.4432.  The court held that “a state has standing to bring suit to protect 
itself and the interests of its citizens” based on the federal government’s “refusal to 
act in a realm where other governmental entities are barred from interfering.” 
ROA.4432.  Plaintiffs themselves did not advance this standing theory, and the court 
conceded that it had found no other case in which a court deemed “abdication,” 
without more, sufficient to support standing.  ROA.4442, n.48. 
The district court’s “abdication standing” theory suffers from two basic 
defects.  First, it fails on the law.  It allows States to invoke the judicial power to 
challenge any exercise of authority by the federal government in the exclusively 
federal domain of immigration, based on nothing more than a State’s disagreement 
with the federal government’s policy priorities and choices about how best to allocate 
limited resources.  As the present case amply illustrates, it invites judicial intervention 
in policy disputes without anything approaching the kind of concrete and cognizable 
injury that is an “irreducible” requirement of Article III.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).1  The district court’s abdication reasoning is particularly 
misconceived because it transforms the well-recognized bar to the uninvited exercise 
of state authority in the field of immigration into a justification for allowing a State to 
                                                 
1 Nothing in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per 
curiam), supports the “abdication standing” theory.  Adams does not even address the 
question of standing.  
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interfere with federal immigration discretion through the judiciary.   
Second, the district court’s premise is wrong on the facts.  Far from abdicating 
its authority, DHS is vigorously enforcing the Nation’s immigration laws, using the 
resources that Congress has allocated it.  From 2009 through 2014, DHS removed 
approximately 2.4 million aliens from the United States—an unprecedented number.  
See Migration Policy Institute, Deportation and Discretion: Reviewing the Record and Options 
for Change 13, 15 (Oct. 2014) (DHS removal data for 2009-2013); DHS Releases End of 
Year Statistics, http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/dhs-releases-end-year-statistics 
(Dec. 18, 2014) (DHS removal data for 2014); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500 (“Hundreds 
of thousands of aliens are removed by the Federal Government every year.”).  
Moreover, DHS is devoting unprecedented resources to secure the southern border.  
These resources have contributed to a significant reduction in the number of aliens 
attempting to enter the country illegally.  See ROA.928; ROA.4109. 
Notwithstanding DHS’s aggressive enforcement efforts, approximately 11.3 
million undocumented aliens still live in the United States, and many others are newly 
apprehended at the border each year.  Congress, however, has chosen not to incur the 
immense fiscal and humanitarian cost of removing every removable alien.  Instead, 
Congress has provided DHS with limited enforcement resources and has tasked DHS 
with making the hard choices about how to prioritize its limited resources as 
“necessary.”  See 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3).  Consistent with Congress’s direction, DHS has 
chosen to prioritize removal of aliens who pose national security threats, have 
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committed serious crimes, and have recently crossed the border illegally.  DHS has 
correspondingly chosen to defer removing certain aliens who pose no such danger, 
who entered the United States years ago, and whose removal would impose significant 
humanitarian costs given their longstanding and close family ties to the country.  This 
approach is the polar opposite of “abdication.”  It represents responsible immigration 
enforcement that advances national security and public safety in the face of real-world 
resource constraints.  Cf. Texas, 106 F.3d at 667 (“Real or perceived inadequate 
enforcement of immigration laws does not constitute a reviewable abdication of 
duty”).   
C. Texas’s Decision to Subsidize Driver’s Licenses Does Not Give It 
Standing. 
 
The district court’s only other ground for finding Article III injury—financial 
losses Texas that expects to incur in issuing driver’s licenses to aliens accorded 
deferred action—is also meritless.  Under the structure of our Constitution, the 
incidental and attenuated consequences of an exercise of enforcement discretion by 
federal authorities under federal law—especially in an area like immigration that the 
Constitution commits to the federal government—are not cognizable injuries that 
entitle a third party to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  In any event, 
nothing in the Secretary’s Deferred Action Guidance requires States to issue driver’s 
licenses to aliens who are accorded deferred action or to subsidize the costs.  A State’s 
choice to incur costs in issuing licenses to aliens accorded deferred action is simply 
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that—the State’s choice.  What is more, the district court failed to take account of the 
fact that implementation of the Guidance will lead to countervailing fiscal advantages 
for the States, such as increased tax revenues from aliens who are able to work legally 
for the first time. 
1. The district court’s driver’s-license theory of standing threatens to radically 
alter the balance between the States and the federal government contemplated by 
Article III, particularly, but not exclusively, in the realm of immigration enforcement.  
DHS regulations allow many categories of aliens to obtain work authorization, 
including lawful permanent residents, asylees, and parolees; aliens who have pending 
applications for lawful permanent residence, asylum, or parole; and aliens subject to a 
final order of removal who have been released on supervision.  See 8 C.F.R. 
274a.12(a), (c).  The district court’s theory—that Texas had standing because aliens 
accorded deferred action could obtain work authorization and thereby qualify for 
subsidized driver’s licenses under Texas law—could thus enable a State to claim 
standing every time the federal government affords immigration relief to an alien who 
falls within one of these categories.  Such challenges to federal grants of immigration 
relief would run flatly contrary to settled law.  See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507.   
Furthermore, neither plaintiffs nor the court identified any limiting principle 
that would confine the district court’s conclusion to the realm of immigration.  The 
court’s rationale risks allowing States to second-guess any federal policy that has some 
downstream effect on States.  Such a theory could invite States to attempt to 
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challenge grants of probation or supervised release for convicted criminals, or federal 
actions that result in individuals moving from one State to another, or indeed any 
federal policy that could trigger some service provided by state law.  Article III 
provides no support for such a boundless theory of standing.     
2. The district court’s driver’s-license standing theory fails even on its own 
terms, for the Guidance does not require Texas or any other State to issue driver’s 
licenses to aliens accorded deferred action.  The Texas Legislature chose to allow any 
alien with work authorization to apply for a driver’s license.  See Tex. Transp. Code 
521.142(a), 521.1425(d) (making non-citizens eligible for a license upon presentation 
of “documentation issued by the appropriate United States agency that authorizes the 
applicant to be in the United States”).  The Supreme Court has made clear that 
injuries to a State’s fisc that “result[] from decisions by [the] state legislature[]” cannot 
form the basis for Article III standing.  Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 664 
(1976).  Furthermore, Texas chooses the price that it charges for driver’s licenses.  
Texas could decline to subsidize driver’s licenses if it believed that the subsidy is not 
worthwhile.  Texas cannot manufacture an injury by complaining of costs that it 
controls.2  Thus, to the extent Texas suffers any attenuated financial harm from 
                                                 
2 The district court erroneously believed that the REAL ID Act requires plaintiffs to 
pay a fee of $0.75 per driver’s license to the federal government. See ROA.4398; 
ROA.4405-4406.  Participation in the REAL ID Act is not required.  Numerous 
States—including four plaintiff States—have declined to participate.  See DHS, REAL 
ID Enforcement in Brief, http://www.dhs.gov/real-id-enforcement-brief. The States that 
choose to participate in the REAL ID Act pay a fee to the federal government only 
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issuing and subsidizing driver’s licenses for those accorded deferred action, that 
financial harm —at best—amounts to a “self-inflicted injur[y],” which provides no 
basis for Article III standing. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1152. 
 The district court mistakenly believed that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Arizona DREAM Act Coalition v. Brewer (“ADAC”), 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014), 
compels Texas to provide and subsidize driver’s licenses for aliens accorded deferred 
action.  But ADAC did not even address subsidies or the fees a state may charge for 
driver’s licenses.  In ADAC, the Ninth Circuit preliminarily enjoined, on equal 
protection grounds, an Arizona executive order that denied driver’s licenses to aliens 
accorded deferred action, but allowed driver’s licenses to be issued to other aliens that 
the court concluded were similarly situated.  Id. at 1067.  The court held that the 
policy was likely unconstitutional because there was “no rational relationship between 
Defendants’ policy and a legitimate state interest.”  Id. at 1065.  A State suffers no 
cognizable injury from the application of federal law by complying with a 
constitutional mandate to issue driver’s licenses rationally under state law. See Texas, 
106 F.3d at 666 (noting that steps “required by the equal protection clause rather than 
by actions of the federal defendants” were not attributable to the federal 
                                                                                                                                                             
because of that choice to participate. See Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 202.  And 
nothing requires participating States to bear this cost themselves rather than pass it 
along to drivers by increasing the fees charged for obtaining a license. 
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government).3 
Nor, contrary to the district court’s suggestion, do federal preemption prin-
ciples require States to issue licenses to aliens accorded deferred action.  The district 
court misunderstood the federal government’s amicus brief in ADAC.  The brief 
explained that federal law preempted Arizona’s particular policy of refusing to accept 
federal employment authorization documents from certain aliens while accepting 
them from others.  See ROA.1309-1312.  But the government took care to add that 
“even if a state licensing scheme distinguishes among classes of aliens,” federal law 
nevertheless may permit such a scheme “if the classifications are borrowed from 
federal law and further a substantial state purpose.”  ROA.1312.  
3. The district court’s holding that the attenuated financial cost of providing 
driver’s licenses supports Article III standing also disregards the likelihood that 
implementation of the Guidance will produce positive economic consequences for the 
States—which is one reason why numerous States have concluded that the Guidance 
will benefit them and therefore oppose the nationwide injunction.  Plaintiffs dismiss 
these likely consequences as mere “hunches.”  ROA.1234.  It is plaintiffs, however, 
not defendants, who bear the burden of showing that harm to them is “certainly 
                                                 
3 Moreover, even if ADAC did require States to issue driver’s licenses to aliens 
accorded deferred action, the district court only made a finding that Texas incurs 
costs by issuing subsidized driver’s licenses, and only two other plaintiff States 
(Wisconsin and Indiana) attempted to prove that they will incur similar costs.  See Pls.’ 
Opp. to Stay at 7 n.14.  None of those States is in the Ninth Circuit.  Thus, regardless 
of how ADAC is read, it does not force any plaintiff to incur costs by subsidizing 
driver’s licenses for aliens accorded deferred action. 
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impending.”  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148.  They have not shown, and the district 
court did not find, that any costs of issuing driver’s licenses will exceed these 
countervailing advantages.   
Most obviously, implementation of the Guidance will likely expand the States’ 
tax bases.  Aliens who receive work authorization will likely earn higher wages and pay 
more taxes.  See ROA.2472-73 (discussing data from previous exercises of deferred 
action).  In Texas alone, it has been estimated that the 2014 DACA and DAPA 
policies will produce a $338 million increase in the tax base over five years. See 
ROA.2473.  Further, work authorization will make those accorded deferred action 
more likely to obtain work-sponsored health insurance, thereby decreasing potential 
reliance on state-subsidized health care.  ROA.2476.  And allowing parents of U.S. 
citizens and lawful permanent residents to augment their incomes by working legally 
will help them better support their children.   
Even when viewed in isolation, issuing driver’s licenses provides States with 
many advantages.  People with driver’s licenses are more likely to pay vehicle 
registration fees and produce other revenues associated with car ownership.  Texas 
itself acknowledges the significance of these revenues.  See Texas Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, About TxDMV, http://www.txdmv.gov/about-us (explaining that for 
“every $1 the [Texas DMV] spends, it returns more than $10 in state revenue”).  
Moreover, issuing driver’s licenses reduces accidents and lowers insurance costs for 
other drivers. See ROA.2614-2616; Nina Bernstein, Spitzer Grants Illegal Immigrants 
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Easier Access to Driver’s Licenses, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2007 (issuing driver’s licenses to 
undocumented aliens expected to save New York drivers $120 million each year). 
The States are wrong to suggest that “the expenditure of money is an injury, no 
matter when or whether that expenditure is offset.”  ROA.1233. When the 
government’s enforcement discretion produces incidental costs and benefits, a third 
party suffers no cognizable injury at all—and a plaintiff surely may not fabricate an 
Article III injury by cherry-picking the costs and ignoring the benefits.  If, for 
example, the federal government builds a military base in a State, creating thousands 
of local jobs and millions of dollars in annual tax revenues, the State cannot claim that 
the government has caused it an injury because the State needs to pay for new traffic 
lights to handle the increased traffic that results.  Cf. Henderson, 287 F.3d at 379-80 
(use of plaintiffs’ tax dollars to produce a challenged license plate “is insufficient to 
confer standing” in part because motorists who choose the license plate pay additional 
fees that “offset the administrative costs” of the plates).  
D. Plaintiffs’ Other Standing Theories Are Meritless. 
 
The district court properly rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the Guidance 
would impose additional law-enforcement and social-services costs on States by 
encouraging new immigration to the United States.  ROA.4427.  Because aliens may 
not seek deferred action under the Guidance unless they have already been in the 
country for several years, any increase in immigration would at most be based on a 
misunderstanding and therefore would not be fairly traceable to the Guidance.  And 
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given the numerous other factors that bear on the decision to migrate, the court 
correctly found that attributing future increases in immigration to the Guidance would 
be unduly speculative.  ROA.4431. 
Nor may the States assert standing on behalf of their citizens under a parens 
patriae theory against the United States.  A “State does not have standing as parens 
patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government” on behalf of its citizens.  
Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982); 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923).  Nor does Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497 (2007), independently authorize the States to litigate on behalf of their 
citizens.  Massachusetts relied on the fact that the State had demonstrated an injury to 
its own quasi-sovereign interests, 549 U.S. at 522, and the Court further deemed it “of 
critical importance” that Congress had authorized the exact type of challenge the State 
brought, id. at 516.  Because the States have failed to satisfy the predicate requirement 
of an injury-in-fact to their own interests, and because no federal statute provides the 
States a right or cause of action, Massachusetts does not apply here.  Indeed, 8 U.S.C. 
1252(g) expressly forecloses suits brought by the parties most directly affected by 
deferred-action decisions: the aliens themselves.  AAADC, 525 U.S. at 483-85. 
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II. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON 
THEIR CLAIM THAT THE DEFERRED ACTION 
GUIDANCE REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT. 
 
Even if this were a justiciable controversy, plaintiffs would be unlikely to 
succeed because they have no right to judicial review under the APA, and in 
any event, the notice-and-comment claim fails on the merits. 
A. The States Have No Right To Judicial Review Under The 
APA.  
 
  The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the 
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”  5 U.S.C. 702(a).  However, this 
right of action is not available if the relevant statute expressly or impliedly precludes 
judicial review.  5 U.S.C. 701(a)(1); see, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 
340, 345-52 (1984).   Moreover, even if review is not precluded altogether, a plaintiff 
has no right to review under § 702(a) unless the interests asserted are “arguably within 
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question.” Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 
153 (1970).  Both of these limitations bar plaintiffs’ claims. 
  The INA does not depart from the general background rules that the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion is presumptively unreviewable, Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831, and 
that one cannot “contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is 
neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.”  Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619.  To 
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the contrary, the INA expressly shields enforcement decisions from judicial review.  It 
declares, with exceptions not relevant here, that “no court shall have jurisdiction to 
hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or 
action by the [Secretary] to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 
removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”  8 U.S.C. 1252(g).  The Supreme 
Court has emphasized that the statute adding this provision to the INA was “aimed at 
protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts—indeed, that can fairly be said 
to be the theme of the legislation.”  AAADC, 525 U.S. at 485-86.  And section 
1252(g) in particular “was directed against a particular evil:  attempts to impose 
judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.”  Id. at 485 n.9. 
 Given the traditions against judicial review of enforcement discretion reflected 
in Chaney and Linda R.S., and given that the INA expressly bars challenges to the 
Secretary’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion by aliens directly affected by these 
exercises of discretion, the absence of any provision affirmatively providing for third 
parties to bring such suits is a compelling indication that the INA implicitly precludes 
them.  See Block, 467 U.S. at 347 (absence from a complex statute of provisions 
expressly authorizing suits by particular parties is sufficient reason to believe Congress 
intended to foreclose their right to judicial review). 
 Moreover, permitting individual States to contest federal immigration 
enforcement policies would be inconsistent with the INA’s overarching purpose of 
vesting the federal government with exclusive authority to determine whether and 
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when an alien must be removed from the United States.  The INA gives expression to 
this power by vesting the Secretary with exclusive authority to “[e]stablish[] national 
immigration enforcement policies and priorities,” including broad discretion over the 
decision whether to remove particular aliens.  See 6 U.S.C. 202(5).   The INA does not 
entitle the States to any role in this process.  They are not accorded statutory rights to 
participate in the formulation of the Secretary’s enforcement priorities.  They have no 
right to challenge an enforcement determination.  They have no independent power 
to effect an alien’s removal themselves.  Indeed, state laws or other state actions that 
interfere with the federal government’s exclusive authority to determine whether an 
alien should be removed are preempted because they “violate[] the principle that the 
removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government.”  Arizona, 
132 S. Ct. at 2506.  
 For all of these reasons, the INA is properly understood to preclude judicial 
review here.  And for much the same reasons, plaintiffs fail the “zone of interests” 
test, which asks whether Congress intended for a particular plaintiff to be heard to 
complain of the challenged agency action.  Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 
(1987); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014).  
The statute in question need not be specifically intended to benefit the plaintiff, 
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, but when a plaintiff is not itself the object of the challenged 
regulatory action, the plaintiff has no right of review if its “interests are so marginally 
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related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot 
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.”  Id. 
 Here, nothing in the text, structure, or purposes of the INA suggests that 
Congress intended to permit States to invoke incidental and attenuated effects of the 
federal government’s immigration enforcement policies in order to contest their 
procedural or substantive validity.  The APA requires a clear showing that Congress 
intended that “a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency 
decision.”  Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.  Even assuming that a federal immigration policy 
had incidental economic consequences for States, that does not mean that Congress, 
in derogation of the federal government’s plenary authority over immigration matters, 
intended in the INA to give States a role in enforcing the immigration laws or 
challenging the Secretary’s exercise of discretion to administer the statute.  See Texas, 
106 F.3d at 667; Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform v. Reno, 93 F.3d 897, 901 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). 
B.   The Deferred Action Guidance Is A Statement Of Policy 
   That Does Not Require Notice and Comment.  
 
 The APA generally requires rulemaking to be conducted on the basis of public 
notice and comment, 5 U.S.C. 553(b), but it expressly exempts “interpretative rules, 
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” 
from this requirement, id. § 553(b)(3)(A), thereby confining the notice-and-comment 
requirement to substantive or legislative rules. The district court’s decision reflects a 
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fundamental misunderstanding of the differences between substantive or legislative 
rules on the one hand and statements of policy on the other. 
 1.  Substantive or legislative rules have the force and effect of law.  Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979).  They grant legal rights, impose legal 
obligations, or otherwise have a significant effect on the legal rights or private 
interests of third parties.  See Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 
908 (5th Cir. 1983).  Statements of policy, by contrast, “advise the public 
prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary 
power.”  Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (quotation marks omitted).  They 
address the agency’s internal decision-making and inform the public how the agency 
intends to exercise its discretion.  They do not establish the rights or obligations of 
third parties. Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 
1995). 
 An agency document such as the 2014 Guidance, which sets forth enforcement 
priorities and threshold criteria for the agency’s allocation of its limited enforcement 
resources as guidance to its own employees, does not have the force and effect of law 
and does not establish binding norms of conduct for members of the public.  Instead, 
it “advise[s] the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to 
exercise a discretionary power,” Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 197, and is consequently exempt 
from notice and comment. 
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Thus, for example, in Department of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145 (5th 
Cir. 1984), this Court held that an agency’s plan for targeting employers with the 
highest injury rate for safety inspections was not a legislative rule that needed to be 
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking.  The Court stressed that the 
agency plan merely set forth a rational means of allocating the agency’s inspection 
resources, without determining the rights or obligations of any of the employers 
within the agency’s regulatory purview.  Id. at 1155.   
Similarly, in American Hospital Ass’n  v. Bowen, 834 F.3d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 
the D.C. Circuit held that notice and comment were not required for a provision of an 
agency manual that set standards governing when government enforcement agents 
would review the quality and appropriateness of hospital services billed to Medicare.  
The court reasoned that the manual provisions established the frequency and focus 
for enforcement review, so that enforcement agents would “concentrate their limited 
resources” on areas where further scrutiny was apt to prove most fruitful.  Id. at 1050; 
see also Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 1987) (INS 
guidelines for deferred enforcement action against immigration-law violators 
“inform[] the public concerning the agency’s future . . . priorities for exercising its 
discretionary power” and are thus general policy statements exempt from notice-and-
comment rulemaking); Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537-38 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (non-binding guidance for exercise of agency’s enforcement 
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discretion not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking); Aulenback, Inc. v. FHA, 
103 F.3d 156, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 The exercises of enforcement discretion in Kast and Bowen were characterized 
by the courts as procedural rules rather than statements of policy.  But for purposes 
of determining whether notice-and-comment rulemaking is required, that is a 
distinction without a difference, because the APA treats procedural rules and 
statements of policy identically and distinguishes both of them from substantive and 
legislative rules.  See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).  The critical question under section 553 is 
whether a rule establishes new substantive rights or a binding standard of conduct 
having the force and effect of law with respect to third parties, not whether it should 
be labeled a procedural rule or a statement of policy.  Prof’ls & Patients, 56 F.3d at 595.  
Kast and Bowen thus apply with full force here. 
 The district court believed that notice and comment are required whenever 
internal agency directives constrain the discretion of agency subordinates.  As shown 
below, the Guidance does not divest agency officers of discretion.  But more 
fundamentally, the court was mistaken in thinking that limiting the discretion of 
agency subordinates is, standing alone, sufficient to trigger notice-and-comment 
requirements.  To the contrary, the courts have long recognized that “agency 
instructions to agency officers are not legislative rules.”  Kast, 744 F.2d at 1152 n.13 
(collecting cases).    
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 Constraints on the discretion of agency subordinates are subject to notice and 
comment only when they also have a direct, coercive impact on regulated parties by 
establishing binding norms for their future conduct.  The court found such a situation 
in Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  There, an FDA 
policy announced a new safe harbor freeing regulated parties from the likelihood of 
enforcement action.  The agency admitted it would be effectively estopped from 
bringing an enforcement action against regulated parties whose primary conduct fell 
within the safe harbor.  Id. at 948.  The threat of enforcement action outside the safe 
harbor (coupled with the elimination of any threat within it) had the effect of coercing 
regulated entities to alter their primary conduct; they could ignore the policy only at 
their peril.  Thus, the court found that, as a practical matter, the establishment of the 
safe harbor was tantamount to a legislative rule establishing norms for the future 
conduct of a regulated party.  The court accordingly required notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. Id.; see also Chamber of Commerce v. DOL, 174 F.3d 206, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(OSHA mandatory-inspection policy subject to  notice-and-comment requirement 
because it threatened regulated entities with enforcement action if they did not 
conform to new norms announced by the mandatory-inspection policy); Am. Trucking 
Ass’n, 659 F.2d at 463-64. 
 Here, by contrast, the 2014 Guidance does not create new norms governing or 
coercing the conduct of aliens subject to the INA.   Questions as to whether the alien 
entered the country unlawfully or subsequently violated legal limitations on admission 
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or right to remain are governed by the INA and implementing regulations, not the 
Guidance.  The Guidance does not establish norms for an alien’s future conduct.   
Rather, the availability of deferred action under the Guidance depends on actions in 
the past—such as an alien’s date of entry or existing familial relationships—that aliens 
cannot alter in the future.  The Guidance thus establishes no rights or obligations but 
merely advises the public of how DHS intends to exercise its enforcement discretion. 
Agencies often issue policy statements that direct subordinates in allocating 
limited resources when choosing among the universe of potential violators.  For 
example, U.S. Attorney’s Offices have adopted policies against prosecuting low-level 
violations, such as theft from interstate shipment of property worth less than $500.  
DOJ Report, United States Attorneys’ Written Guidelines for the Declination of Alleged 
Violations of Federal Criminal Laws 6-9, 22-24 (1979); see 18 U.S.C. 659.  And the 
Selective Service Agency adopted a “passive enforcement” policy under which it 
initiated enforcement action only against non-registrants “who report themselves as 
having violated the law, or who are reported by others.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 600 (1985).  This policy effectively exempted all but 286 people from a universe 
of 674,000 estimated violators (99.96%), yet it did not go through notice and 
comment.  See id. at 604 & n.3.   
Sound policy reasons support Congress’s decision to exempt such internal 
directives from notice-and-comment requirements.   DHS may consider exercising 
prosecutorial discretion in hundreds of thousands of cases each year.  The adoption of 
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standardized threshold criteria for use in evaluating whether to exercise enforcement 
discretion guards against arbitrary, ad hoc decision-making by ensuring that each 
individual decision is consistent with national enforcement priorities established by 
Congress and the Secretary. The public announcement of such policies also promotes 
transparency and accountability.  Congress exempted statements of policy from the 
APA’s notice-and-comment requirements precisely to encourage agencies to 
promulgate such statements.  See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946) 
(reprinting 1945 Senate Judiciary Committee print) (the first reason “for the exclusion 
of rules of organization, procedure, interpretation, and policy” from notice and 
comment requirements is “to encourage the making of such rules.”)   “If agencies are 
allowed to establish policies that limit their discretion and that of their employees only 
through the use of the expensive and time-consuming notice and comment 
procedure, they will rarely choose to limit their discretion at all.”  Kenneth Culp Davis 
& Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise, § 6.2 (3d ed. 1994).  The district 
court’s approach would ultimately impair these important interests in transparency 
and public accountability. 
 2.   The district court further erred in concluding that the Guidance obligates 
DHS to defer the removal of any aliens who meet the threshold criteria in the 
Guidance. 
 The starting point for determining whether a rule is a statement of policy is the 
agency’s own characterization of its intent and operation.  Prof’ls & Patients, 56 F.3d at 
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596.  Here, the guidelines explicitly state that the deferred action policies are to be 
applied on a case-by-case basis, that they do not establish substantive rights or 
obligations, and that they create no entitlement to deferred action, even if an alien 
otherwise meets the guideline’s threshold eligibility criteria for deferred action.  
ROA.84-87. 
In practice, the guidelines are inherently discretionary and leave room for 
individualized case-by-case determinations of whether deferred action is appropriate.  
They permit broad consideration of anything that indicates an alien “poses a threat to 
national security or public safety” or any “other factors that, in the exercise of 
discretion, make[] the grant of deferred action inappropriate.”   ROA.86.  The fact 
that the guidelines require such individualized evaluation demonstrates that they are 
not a legislative or substantive rule subject to notice-and-comment requirements.  Cf.  
Prof’ls & Patients, 56 F.3d at 598 (FDA statements that it would take enforcement 
action against pharmacies engaged in distributing an “inordinate amount” of 
compounded drugs left room for case-by-case evaluation and did not bind agency’s 
discretion).  
The district court reasoned that the high approval rates under the 2012 DACA 
guidelines (which are not at issue here) indicate that the agency’s assertion of 
discretion under the 2014 Guidance is pretextual.  ROA.4483-4484.  But the eligibility 
criteria in the 2014 Guidance had not gone into effect at the time the court issued its 
preliminary injunction.  There is thus no record of prior administrative practice under 
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the guidelines set forth in the 2014 Guidance.  The reviewing court cannot disregard 
official statements of the agency’s intent on the basis of mere speculation about the 
agency’s future conduct. 
 The court’s findings in Arpiao contradict the district court’s perception of how 
the 2012 DACA guidelines have been implemented.  The Arpaio court held: (1) that 
the Secretary retained discretion under the 2012 DACA guidelines to consider each 
request for deferred action on a case-by-case basis; (2) that decisions were based on a 
balancing of a number of factors; and (3) that statistics on the approval and denial of 
deferred action under the 2012 DACA guidelines showed that case-by-case review 
does occur in practice.  27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 193-94.  Record evidence below supports 
the same conclusion.  See ROA.4146-4149 (DHS official citing instances where 
deferred action was not accorded to aliens who met the threshold guideline criteria 
where the alien was affiliated with a gang, had made false statements in immigration 
petitions or applications, had a series of arrests but no disqualifying conviction, or was 
otherwise deemed to pose a threat to public safety).4   
                                                 
4  Without providing reasons for discrediting these statements that deferred action 
could be denied for discretionary reasons, the court simply asserted that these 
statements did not provide the level of detail that the court requested. Compare 
ROA.4385, with ROA.4146-4149.  Moreover, contrary to the district court’s 
assertions, ROA.4484, n.99, DHS decision forms do provide an opportunity for 
discretionary denials of deferred action. See ROA.1841 (DHS decision form with 
check-box to indicate that an alien may be denied deferred action because the alien 
“otherwise do[es] not warrant a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion because 
of national security or public safety concerns”).   
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 The district court discounted that evidence because the great majority of 2012 
DACA requesters had been accorded deferred action.  ROA.4484, n.101.  But that is 
neither surprising nor inconsistent with the existence of agency discretion.  The 2012 
guidelines, like the 2014 guidelines, establish a process whereby aliens without lawful 
status can identify themselves to DHS and request that any action on their removal be 
deferred.  The pool of aliens requesting deferred action is thus self-selective, and few 
can be expected to risk bringing themselves to DHS’s attention if prior arrests, gang 
affiliations, or some other circumstances make them poor candidates for deferred 
action—especially when the process requires a background check.  ROA.86.  The 
court thus erred in ignoring the terms of the 2014 Guidance and concluding that the 
guidelines mandate deferred action and preclude case-by-case evaluation. 
 3.   The district court further erred in requiring notice-and-comment 
rulemaking because the Guidance supposedly establishes a new legal right to remain 
in the United States.  The court focused on language in the Guidance indicating that 
aliens accorded deferred action are considered to be “lawfully present” for some 
purposes.  But an alien who has been accorded deferred action is “lawfully present” 
on a temporary basis only in the limited sense that the agency plans not to seek the 
alien’s removal, as an exercise of revocable discretion, for an identified period of time.  
ROA.84.  The alien does not obtain a legal entitlement to remain here.  Deferred 
action “does not confer any form of legal status in this country” and may be revoked 
or terminated at any time, in the Secretary’ sole discretion.  ROA.84.  Moreover, if 
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DHS chooses to remove a deferred action recipient, the fact that the alien previously 
had deferred action provides the alien with no legal defense to removal. 
 The district court also appears to have assumed that merely being present in 
the United States is a crime and that deferred action is tantamount to a grant of 
amnesty that excuses that crime.  But while it is a crime to enter the United States 
unlawfully or to reenter illegally after having been removed, 8 U.S.C. 1325, 1326, it is 
not a crime simply to be present in the United States after an unlawful entry.  See 
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.  Rather, aliens without lawful immigration status are 
removable.  See 8 U.S.C. 1227.  Deferred action therefore is not a grant of amnesty.  
Instead, like myriad other exercises of immigration enforcement discretion, it reflects 
DHS’s decision not to expend its limited resources, for a period of time, in bringing 
removal proceedings against an alien.  See 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(14).  What the district 
court described as “lawful presence” is nothing more than the inevitable consequence 
of any exercise of prosecutorial discretion:  remaining free of the government’s 
coercive power for so long as the government continues to forebear from exercising 
that power. 
 4.  The district court also erred in concluding that the 2014 Guidance 
establishes a new right to work lawfully in the United States.  Aliens accorded 
deferred action may be authorized to work if they apply for employment 
authorization, pay the necessary processing fees, and establish an economic necessity 
for employment.  But that is the result of a 1981 regulation that makes all aliens 
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accorded deferred action eligible to apply for work authorization. 8 C.F.R. 
274a.12(c)(14); see 46 Fed. Reg. 25079-03, 25081 (May 5, 1981).  It is that long-
established regulation, not the 2014 Guidance, that permits aliens accorded deferred 
action to apply for employment authorization.  That regulation went through an 
extended process of notice and public comment before its adoption, in conformity 
with the APA.  See 44 Fed. Reg. 43480 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 19563 (1980); 46 Fed. 
Reg. 25079 (1981); 46 Fed. Reg. 25081 (1981) (adding 8 C.F.R. 101.9(b)(6)).  When a 
regulation is issued in compliance with the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements, 
the courts have no authority to require yet another round of notice and comment.  See 
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n , 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206-07 (2015).  The possibility of 
work authorization is a consequence of DHS’s discretionary decision to defer action, 
not a legal benefit that the Guidance itself confers. 
5.  Finally, the district court was wrong to hold that the 2014 Guidance is 
subject to notice and comment because it grants aliens new government benefits.  See 
ROA.4485-4486.  The APA’s notice-and-comment requirements do not apply “to the 
extent there is involved . . . a matter relating to . . . loans, grants, benefits, or 
contracts.”  5 U.S.C. 553(b)(2); see Baylor Univ. Hosp. Center v. Heckler, 758 F.2d 1052, 
1058 n.9 (5th Cir. 1985).  Thus, even if the Guidance could be construed to award 
some affirmative government benefit such as cash or in-kind assistance, the express 
terms of the APA would exempt it from notice-and-comment rulemaking.   
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 In any event, the guidelines do not award or create eligibility for cash or in-kind 
assistance, licenses, legal entitlements, governmental services, or any similar benefit.   
Federal statutes make aliens who are accorded deferred action expressly ineligible for 
most federal public benefits.5  See 8 U.S.C. 1611(c), 1641(b) (limiting benefits to 
“qualified aliens,” who are in turn defined as lawful permanent residents, asylees, and 
other aliens with lawful immigration status).  Federal statutes also make aliens 
accorded deferred action ineligible for state or local government benefits unless the 
pertinent State enacts a law specifically providing for their eligibility. 8 U.S.C. 1621; see 
also Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 134 So. 3d 432, 437 (Fla. 2014).  These statutory 
provisions reflect a national policy that “aliens within the Nation’s borders not 
depend on public resources to meet their needs,” and that “[s]elf-sufficiency has been 
a basic principle of United States immigration law since this country’s earliest 
immigration statutes.”  8 U.S.C. 1601.  The Guidance is fully consistent with these 
statutory limitations.  Indeed, by enabling aliens to obtain work authorization, the 
Guidance furthers Congress’s objectives of ensuring that aliens earn their way, pay 
taxes, and do not burden the public fisc. 
The restriction on eligibility for federal public benefits in 8 U.S.C. 1611 
does not bar aliens who are accorded deferred action from receiving social 
                                                 
5  The statutory bar to alien eligibility for federal benefits does not preclude certain 
emergency services, regardless of the alien’s immigration status.  8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(1).   
An alien’s ability to access these emergency and related services is thus established by 
existing law and is unaffected by the Guidance. 
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security retirement benefits, social security disability benefits, or health 
insurance under Part A of the Medicare program.  8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(2), (b)(3).  
But social security and Medicare both generally require work and payment of 
payroll taxes for a substantial period of time before an individual may become 
eligible for benefits.  See 42 U.S.C. 413, 414(a) (Title II social security 
retirement); 42 U.S.C. 423(c) (social security disability), 42 U.S.C. 426, 1395c 
(Medicare).  An alien with work authorization may obtain a Social Security 
Number (SSN) and accrue quarters of covered employment toward meeting 
these requirements.6  See 20 C.F.R. 422.104(a)(2), 422.105(a); 8 C.F.R. 
1.3(a)(4)(vi).  And once a valid SSN is obtained, an alien may correct wage 
records to add prior covered employment within approximately three years of 
the year in which the wages were earned, see 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(1)(B), (c)(4), or in 
limited circumstances thereafter, see id. § 405(c)(5)(A)-(J).  But it generally takes 
five years (20 quarters) of covered employment to establish eligibility for social 
security disability benefits, and ten years (40 quarters) to establish eligibility for 
                                                 
6 Aliens whose social security benefit applications are based on SSNs assigned before 
January 1, 2004, may count earnings in covered employment before that date toward 
establishing social security eligibility, regardless of whether that work was lawfully 
authorized.  See  P.L. 108-203, Title II, § 211, adding 42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C. 414(c), and 
amending 42 U.S.C. 423(a)(1)(C), effective January 1, 2004; see also S. Rep. No. 108-
176, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (2003) (explaining law prior to enactment of P.L. 
108-203).  Aliens who obtain an SSN that, at the time of assignment, or at any later 
time, is consistent with work authorization may similarly count all earnings in covered 
employment credited to that account number, regardless of prior work authorization.  
See 42 U.S.C. 414 (c)(2)(A), 405(c)(2)(B)(i)(I). These rules, however, were established 
by existing law, not the Guidance.  
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social security retirement benefits and most Medicare Part A coverage—far 
longer than the three-year period of deferred action set forth in the 2014 
Guidance.  The immediate effect of deferred action and employment 
authorization is not to render aliens eligible for receipt of Medicare or social 
security payments, but rather to facilitate their payment of payroll taxes into the 
funds that support current retirees and Medicare beneficiaries. 
III. THE BALANCE OF HARMS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
 WEIGH STRONGLY AGAINST THE PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION. 
 
A. A preliminary injunction cannot be based on a mere “possibility” of 
irreparable harm to the plaintiff.  Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).  Rather, 
“plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief [must] demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely 
in the absence of an injunction.”  Id.  Here, because plaintiffs have failed to establish 
that they will suffer any cognizable injury, they have necessarily failed to show that 
they will suffer an irreparable harm.  Accord Arpaio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 208 (noting that 
“the same problem that confronts the plaintiff’s standing argument . . . likewise 
dooms the plaintiff’s ability to show irreparable harm”).  
The district court rejected the States’ assertion that they would suffer 
irreparable harm due to a “wave” of illegal immigration, correctly pointing out that 
such alleged harm was not “immediate, direct, or a presently-existing, actual threat.”  
ROA.4489.  But the court accepted plaintiffs’ claim that the 2014 Guidance would 
cause irreparable harm because it would be “virtually irreversible” once implemented.  
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ROA.4490.  The court reasoned that Texas, and perhaps other States, would expend 
resources issuing and subsidizing driver’s licenses for deferred action recipients, and 
that they would face “the substantially difficult—if not impossible—task of retracting 
any benefits or licenses” if the Guidance were later invalidated.  ROA.4491. 
Neither premise is correct.  For reasons explained above, nothing about the 
2014 Guidance requires States to issue driver’s licenses to aliens accorded deferred 
action, much less to subsidize the costs involved.  To the extent that States choose to 
subsidize licenses, any such attenuated financial cost to the State is not fairly 
attributable to the Guidance.  And even if States were required to issue subsidized 
licenses to aliens accorded deferred action, the States have failed to show that these 
costs outweigh the positive economic consequences for the States of according 
deferred action.  Nor would the Guidance be “virtually irreversible” once 
implemented.  To the contrary, deferred action “may be terminated at any time at the 
agency’s discretion.”  ROA.84.   
B. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving both that “the threatened harm to 
[their interests] will outweigh any potential injury the injunction may cause the 
opposing party” and that “the injunction, if issued, will not be adverse to public 
interest.”  Star Satellite, Inc. v. City of Biloxi, 779 F. 2d 1074, 1079 (5th Cir. 1986).  These 
two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.”  Nken v. Holder, 556 
U.S. 418, 435 (2009).  Here, the harm to the federal government and to the public 
interest caused by the preliminary injunction far exceeds the injury claimed by 
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plaintiffs.  
The preliminary injunction obstructs a core Executive prerogative and prevents 
the Secretary from establishing and effectuating his “policies and priorities” to enforce 
the Nation’s immigration laws.  See 6 U.S.C. 202(5). The court’s order thus offends 
basic separation-of-powers principles, impinging on Executive functions in the 
complex and sensitive field of immigration enforcement.  Moreover, an injunction 
issued at the behest of plaintiff States that lack any authority over the Nation’s 
immigration policies directly contravenes the allocation of powers between the federal 
and state governments. In light of these structural injuries, the preliminary injunction 
harms the federal government in an ongoing manner that cannot be undone if and 
when the Guidance is upheld. 
The injunction prevents DHS from most effectively allocating its resources 
regarding removal of aliens to support its paramount mission to protect the 
Homeland and secure our borders. The 2014 Guidance is an integral part of the 
Secretary’s efforts to prioritize the removal of aliens who most threaten national 
security, public safety, and border security. It is no answer to say, as the district court 
did, that the injunction does not prohibit the Secretary from setting enforcement 
priorities.  The Guidance facilitates the implementation of those priorities.  Instead of 
spending valuable resources determining whether encountered individuals should be 
prioritized for removal, DHS can rely on deferred action documentation to quickly 
determine that they should not be.  As the highest-ranking official for U.S. 
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement explained, the injunction thus “interferes 
with the Federal Government’s comprehensive strategy for enforcing our immigration 
laws.”  ROA.4540; see also Arpaio, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 210-11 (“Halting these deferred 
action programs would inhibit the ability of DHS to focus on its statutorily proscribed 
enforcement priorities (national security, border security, and public safety)”).   
Furthermore, the injunction creates certain intractable administrative burdens 
for DHS and jeopardizes the ultimate success of the Secretary’s policies.  To 
effectively implement the Guidance, DHS must have the necessary infrastructure in 
place before the first requests are submitted.  DHS had already leased space, initiated 
the hiring process for employees, and taken other preparatory steps to implement the 
Guidance before the injunction issued.  ROA.4451, n.55.  Forcing the agency to cease 
these efforts midstream imposed significant administrative burdens on DHS, and 
enjoining such efforts for a prolonged period of time will cause greater and longer-
lasting harm in the future.  The preliminary injunction thus does not merely preserve 
the status quo, but instead compromises substantial preparatory work that DHS had 
already undertaken. Cf. Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 571 (5th Cir. 1981) (granting stay 
to relieve state agency of “burden . . . in terms of time, expense, and administrative 
red tape” of complying with order).   
The preliminary injunction imposes burdens that extend far beyond the federal 
government.  The Guidance is expected to improve public safety by encouraging 
aliens accorded deferred action—who might otherwise fear coming forward—to 
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cooperate with state and local law enforcement officers.  See ROA.4546 (declaration 
of Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection); ROA.2613-2615 (amicus 
brief of Major Cities Chiefs Association, et al.).  The injunction deprives local law 
enforcement and city governments of this significant (and undisputed) benefit.  The 
injunction likewise injures state and local governments by depriving them of the 
significant tax revenues that they would obtain as a result of the Guidance.  And the 
injunction imposes humanitarian burdens on many families of U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents by depriving family members of the prospect of discretionary 
relief. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S NATIONWIDE INJUNCTION 
 IS IN ANY EVENT OVERBROAD. 
 
 The district court’s injunction is drastically overbroad and thus is invalid even if 
some injunction were warranted.   Twenty-four States, the District of Columbia, and 
the U.S. territories are not parties to this action, and a dozen States participated as 
amici below to oppose plaintiffs’ challenge and demonstrate the adverse effects of the 
district court’s injunction.  Yet the district court enjoined the Guidance on a 
nationwide basis, barring implementation in States that do not oppose the policies set 
forth in the Guidance and even in States that actively support them. 
 In these circumstances, a nationwide injunction is a manifest abuse of 
discretion.  An injunction “should be no more burdensome to the defendant than 
necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”  Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 
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682, 702 (1979); Lion Health Servs., Inc. v. Sebelius, 635 F3d 693, 703 (5th Cir.  2011); see 
also Dep’t of Def. v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939 (1993) (staying nationwide injunction insofar 
as it “grants relief to persons other than” named plaintiff).  It must also take account 
of “the larger interests of society that might be adversely affected by an overly broad 
injunction.”  Envtl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981).  The APA’s 
provisions regarding preliminary injunctions incorporate these principles.  See 5 U.S.C. 
705 (“to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury,” reviewing court “may issue” orders 
to “preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings”) 
(emphasis added).  These principles apply with greater force where, as here, the scope 
of the relief harms non-parties.  
 The injunction here is far broader than necessary to redress any purported 
injury to the plaintiff States.  The district court identified only a single, specific injury 
to any of the plaintiffs:  costs Texas expects to incur in processing and subsidizing 
driver’s license applications from aliens accorded deferred action.  ROA.4397-4398; 
ROA.4412.  Only two other plaintiff States (Indiana and Wisconsin) specifically 
alleged that they would incur similar costs.  See Pls.’ Opp. to Stay at 7 n.14.  There is 
no basis for assuming that the other plaintiff States incur the same net cost as Texas, 
especially when twenty-three plaintiffs submitted no evidence on this issue and when 
every State is free to charge license fees that cover its costs. 
 Speculation that Texas might incur additional net costs issuing driver’s 
licenses—and that those costs might not be offset—does not empower the district 
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court even to hear this litigation, much less to enjoin the implementation of the 2014 
Guidance nationwide.  Likewise, the hypothetical and even more attenuated 
possibility that an alien accorded deferred action in another State might move to 
Texas and apply for a driver’s license does not justify barring implementation in all 
fifty States to accommodate one.  Absent a finding that any State other than Texas 
would suffer any identifiable financial injury, the scope of the injunction should be 
confined to Texas.  Failing that, the injunction should not extend beyond the plaintiff 
States.  
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary injunction should be reversed.  In 
the alternative, the injunction should be reversed to the extent that it extends to States 
other than Texas or, at a minimum, as to non-plaintiff States. 
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